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Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have
histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing
public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to
which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in such games. It is always
possible to coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior to have bounded recall
(i.e., there is a bound L such that in any period, the last L signals are sufficient to
determine behavior). We show that, in games with general almost-public private
monitoring, this is essentially the only behavior that can coordinate continuation
play.
Keywords: repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coor-
dination, bounded recall.
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public
Monitoring
by George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
1. Introduction
Intertemporal incentives often allow players to achieve payoffs that are inconsistent with
myopic incentives. For games with public histories, the construction of sequentially
rational equilibria with nontrivial intertemporal incentives is straightforward. Since
continuation play in a public strategy profile is a function of public histories only, the
requirement that continuation play induced by any public history constitute a Nash
equilibrium of the original game is both the natural notion of sequential rationality and
relatively easy to check (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990)). These perfect public
equilibria (or PPE ) use public histories to coordinate continuation play.
While games with private monitoring (where actions and signals are private) have no
public histories to coordinate continuation play, some do have histories that are almost
public. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play for
such games. It is always possible to coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior
to have bounded recall (i.e., there is a bound L such that in any period, the last L signals
are sufficient to determine behavior). We show that, in games with general almost-public
private monitoring, this is essentially the only behavior that can coordinate continuation
play. To make this precise, we must describe what it means for a game to have “general
but almost-public private monitoring” and “essentially.”
Since the coordination-of-continuation-play interpretation depends on the structure
of the strategy profile, we focus on equilibrium strategy profiles, rather than on the
equilibrium payoff set, of private-monitoring games. Very little is known about the
general structure of the equilibrium payoff set for general private-monitoring games.
We return to this issue at the end of the Introduction.
Fix a game with full support public monitoring (so that every signal arises with
strictly positive probability under every action profile). In the minimal perturbation of
the public-monitoring game towards private monitoring, each player observes a private
signal drawn from the space of public signals, and the other specifications of the game
are unchanged. In this private-monitoring game, at the end of each period, there is
a profile of private signals, and we say the game has minimally-private almost-public
monitoring if the probability of any profile in which all players observe the same value
of the signal is close to the probability of that signal in the public-monitoring game
(there is also positive probability that different players observe different values of the
public signal).
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Any strategy profile of a public-monitoring game naturally induces behavior in
minimally-private almost-public-monitoring games.1 Mailath and Morris (2002) in-
troduced a useful representation device for these profiles. Recall that all PPE of a
public-monitoring game can be represented in a recursive way by specifying a state
space, a transition function mapping public signals and states into new states, and
decision rules for the players, specifying behavior in each state (Abreu, Pearce, and
Stacchetti (1990)). We use the same state space, transition function and decision rules
to summarize behavior in the private-monitoring game. Each player will now have a
private state, and the transition function and decision rules define a Markov process on
vectors of private states.
This representation is sufficient to describe behavior under the given strategies, but
(with private monitoring) is not sufficient to verify that the strategies are optimal. It
is also necessary to know how each player’s beliefs over the private states of other play-
ers evolve. This is at the heart of the question of whether histories can coordinate
continuation play, since, given a strategy profile, a player’s private state determines
that player’s continuation play. A sufficient condition for a strict equilibrium to re-
main an equilibrium with private monitoring is that after every history each player
assigns probability uniformly close to one to all other players being in the same private
state (Mailath and Morris (2002, Theorem 4.1)). PPE with bounded recall satisfy this
sufficient condition, since for sufficiently close-by games with minimally-private almost-
public monitoring, the probability that all players observed the same last L signals can
be made arbitrarily close to one. However, under other strategy profiles, the condition
may fail. The grim trigger PPE in some parameterizations of the repeated prisoners’
dilemma, for example, does not induce an equilibrium in any close-by minimally-private
almost-public-monitoring game (Example 2 in Section 3.1).
The restriction to minimally-private almost-public monitoring is substantive, since
all players’ private signals are drawn from a common signal space. In this paper, we
allow for the most general private monitoring consistent with the game being “close-to”
a public-monitoring game. We assume there is a signalling function for each player that
assigns to each private signal either some value of the public signal or a dummy signal
(with the interpretation that that private signal cannot be related to any public signal).
Using these signalling functions (one for each player), there is a natural sense in which
the private monitoring distribution can be said to be close to the public monitoring
distribution, even when the sets of private signals differ, and may have significantly
larger cardinality than that of the set of public signals. We say such games have almost-
public monitoring. If every private signal is mapped to a public signal, we say the
almost-public-monitoring game is strongly close to the public-monitoring game.
1Since player i’s set of histories in the public-monitoring game and in the minimally-private almost-
public-monitoring game agree, the domains for player i’s strategy in the two games also agree.
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Using the signalling functions, any strategy profile of the public-monitoring game
induces behavior in strongly-close-by almost-public-monitoring games. As in minimally-
private almost-public-monitoring games, a player’s private state determines that player’s
continuation play. Given a sequence of private signals for a player, that player’s private
state is determined by the induced sequence of public signals that are the result of
applying his signalling function. Consequently, it might appear that the richness of the
private signals does not alter the situation from the case of minimally-private almost-
public monitoring. However, the richness of the private signals is important for the
formation of that player’s beliefs about the other players’ private states. It turns out
that the requirement that the private-monitoring distribution be close to the public-
monitoring distribution places essentially no restriction on the manner in which private
signals enter into the formation of posterior beliefs. Nonetheless, if the profile has
bounded recall, the richness of the private signals is irrelevant. Indeed, even if the
private-monitoring games are not strongly close to the public-monitoring game, there is
still a natural sense in which every strict PPE with bounded recall induces equilibrium
behavior in every close-by almost-public-monitoring game (Theorem 2).
When a strategy profile of the public-monitoring game does not have bounded recall,
realizations of the signal in early periods can have long-run implications for behavior.
Subject to some technical caveats, we call such a profile separating. While the properties
of bounded recall and separation do not exhaust possible behavior, they do appear
to cover essentially all behaviors of interest.2 When the space of private signals is
sufficiently rich in the values of posterior-odds ratios (this is what we mean by “general
almost public”), and the profile is separating, it is possible to manipulate a player’s
updating over other players’ private states through an appropriate choice of private
history. This suggests that it should be possible to choose a private history with the
property that a player (say, player i) is in one private state and assigns arbitrarily high
probability to all the other players being in a different common private state.
There is a significant difficulty that needs to be addressed in order to make this
argument: The history needs to have the property that player i is very confident of the
other players’ state transitions for any given initial state. This, of course, requires the
monitoring be almost-public. At the same time, monitoring must be sufficiently impre-
cise that player i, after an appropriate initial segment of the history, assigns positive
probability to the other players being in a common state different from i’s private state.
This is the source of the difficulty: for any T -length history, there is an ε (decreasing
in T ) such that for private monitoring ε-close to the public monitoring, player i is suf-
ficiently confident of the period T private states of players j 6= i as a function of their
period t < T private states (and the history). However, this ε puts an upper bound on
2We provide one example of a non-separating profile without bounded recall in Section 5 (Example
6). This profile is not robust to the introduction of even minimally-private monitoring.
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the prior probability that player i can assign in period t to the players j 6= i being in a
common state different from i’s private state. Since the choice of T is decreasing in this
prior (i.e., larger T required for smaller priors), there is a tension in the determination
of T and ε.
We show, however, that any separating profile implementable using a finite number
of states has enough structure that we can choose the history so that not only do relevant
states cycle, but that every other state transits under the cycle to a cycling state. The
cycle allows us to effectively choose the T above independently of the prior, and gives
us our main result (Theorem 4): Separating strict PPE profiles of public-monitoring
games do not induce Nash equilibria in any strongly-close-by games with rich private
monitoring.
Thus, separating strict PPE of public-monitoring games are not robust to the in-
troduction of even a minimal amount of private monitoring. Consequently, separating
behavior in private-monitoring games typically cannot coordinate continuation play
(Corollary 1). On the other hand, bounded recall profiles are robust to the introduction
of private monitoring. The extent to which bounded recall is a substantive restriction
on the set of payoffs is unknown.3 Our results do suggest, even for public-monitoring
games, that bounded recall profiles are particularly attractive (since they are robust
to the introduction of private monitoring). Moreover, other apparently simple strategy
profiles are problematic.
Our focus on equilibrium strategy profiles is in contrast with much of the literature
in repeated games with private monitoring.4 For the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with
almost-perfect private monitoring, folk theorems have been proved using both equilibria
with a coordination interpretation (for example, Sekiguchi (1997), which we discuss in
Example 1, and Bhaskar and Obara (2002)) and those that are “belief-free” (for example,
Piccione (2002), Ely and Välimäki (2002), and Matsushima (2004)5). Loosely, belief-
free equilibria are constructed so that after relevant histories, players are indifferent
between different choices. In games with finite signal spaces, this requires a significant
amount of randomization (randomization is not required with a continuum of signals,
but only because behavior can be purified using signals). Not only is the generality of
this approach unclear (Ely, Hörner, and Olszewski (2003)), the equilibria do not have a
clean coordination interpretation. For example, the profiles in Ely and Välimäki (2002)
3Cole and Kocherlakota (2003) show that for some parameterizations of the repeated prisoners’
dilemma, the restriction to strongly symmetric bounded recall PPE results in a dramatic collapse of the
set of equilibrium payoffs.
4See Kandori (2002) for a brief survey of this literature, as well as the accompanying symposium
issue of the Journal of Economic Theory on “Repeated Games with Private Monitoring.”
5Matsushima (2004) covers general two player games with private monitoring that need not be almost
perfect, with signals that are either conditionally independent or have a particular correlation structure.
His analysis does not cover almost-public-monitoring games.
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are obtained from similar profiles in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with perfect moni-
toring. The perfect-monitoring profiles also have a significant amount of randomization
and are difficult to purify in the sense of Harsanyi (1973). More specifically, while those
profiles only depend on the previous period’s actions, in the relevant equilibrium of the
purifying game, the strategies typically have unbounded memory (Bhaskar, Mailath,
and Morris (2004)).
Finally, we view our findings as underlining the importance of communication in
private-monitoring games as a mechanism to facilitate coordination. For some recent
work on communication in private-monitoring games, see Compte (1998), Kandori and
Matsushima (1998), Fudenberg and Levine (2004), and McLean, Obara, and Postlewaite
(2002).
2. Games with Imperfect Monitoring
2.1. Private-Monitoring Games
The infinitely-repeated game with private monitoring is the infinite repetition of a stage
game in which at the end of the period, each player learns only the realized value of a
private signal. There are n players, with a finite stage-game action set for player i ∈
N ≡ {1. . . . , n} denoted Ai. At the end of each period, each player i observes a private
signal, denoted ωi drawn from a finite set Ωi. The signal vector ω ≡ (ω1, . . . , ωn) ∈ Ω ≡
Ω1 × · · · × Ωn occurs with probability π(ω|a) when the action profile a ∈ A ≡
∏
i Ai is
chosen. Player i does not receive any information other than ωi about the behavior of
the other players. All players use the same discount factor, δ.
Since ωi is the only signal a player observes about opponents’ play, we assume (as
usual) that player i’s payoff after the realization (ω, a) is given by u∗i (ωi, ai). Stage




i (ωi, ai) π (ω|a). It will be convenient to
index games by the monitoring technology (Ω, π), fixing the set of players and action
sets.
A pure strategy for player i in the private-monitoring game is a function si : Hi → Ai,
where
Hi ≡ ∪∞t=1 (Ai × Ωi)t−1
is the set of private histories for player i.
Definition 1 A pure strategy is action-free if, for all hti, ĥ
t
i ∈ Hi satisfying ωτi = ω̂τi




Since action-free strategies play a central role in our analysis, it is useful to note the
following immediate result, which does not require full-support monitoring (its proof is
omitted):
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Lemma 1 Every pure strategy in a private-monitoring game is realization equivalent
to an action-free strategy. Every mixed strategy is realization equivalent to a mixture
over action-free strategies.
Remark 1 Behavior strategies realization equivalent to a mixed strategy will typically
not be action-free. For example, consider the once repeated prisoners’ dilemma, with
action spaces Ai = {ei, ni},6 Ωi = {gi, bi}, and the mixed strategy that assigns equal
probability to the two action-free strategies s̄1 and s̃1, where
s̄1 (∅) = e1; s̄1(g1) = e1, s̄1 (b1) = n1,
and
s̃1 (∅) = n1; s̃1(g1) = n1, s̃1 (b1) = n1.
A behavior strategy realization equivalent to this mixed strategy must specify in the
second period behavior that depends nontrivially on player 1’s first period action. (A
similar observation applies to public-monitoring games: every pure strategy is real-
ization equivalent to a public strategy, every mixed strategy is realization equivalent
to a mixture over public strategies, and yet any behavior strategy that is realization
equivalent to a mixed strategy may not be public.)
Every pure action-free strategy can be represented by a set of states Wi, an initial
state w1i , a decision rule di : Wi → Ai specifying an action choice for each state, and
a transition function σi : Wi × Ωi → Wi. In the first period, player i chooses action
a1i = di(w
1
i ). At the end of the first period, the vector of actions, a
1, then generates a
vector of private signals ω1 according to the distribution π(· |a1), and player i observes











i ), and so on. Any action-free strategy requires at most the countable set
Wi = ∪∞t=1Ωt−1i .
Any collection of pure action-free strategies can be represented by a set of states
Wi, a decision rule di, and a transition function σi (the initial state indexes the pure
strategies). One class of mixed strategies is described by (Wi, µi, di, σi), where µi is a
probability distribution over the initial state w1i , and Wi is countable. Not all mixed
strategies can be described in this way, since the set of all pure strategies is uncountable
(which would require Wi to be uncountable).
Remark 2 A consequence of Remark 1 is that action-free strategy profiles, and pro-
files of mixtures over action-free strategies, are often not sequentially rational. How-
ever, when the monitoring has full support, every Nash equilibrium has a realization-
equivalent sequentially rational strategy profile (see Sekiguchi (1997, Proposition 3) and




e1 2, 2 −1, 3
n1 3,−1 0, 0
Figure 1: The prisoners’ dilemma.
Kandori and Matsushima (1998, p. 648)). Consequently, we focus on Nash equilibria
of games with private monitoring.
Example 1 We will often use the repeated prisoners’ dilemma under various moni-
toring assumptions. The ex ante stage game is given by the normal form in Figure
1.7 Much of the literature has studied almost-perfect conditionally-independent private
monitoring : player i’s signals are given by Ωi = {êi, n̂i}, with âi ∈ Ωi a signal of
aj ∈ Aj ≡ {ej , nj}. Players 1 and 2’s signal are, conditional on the action profile,
independently distributed, with




1− ε, if âi = aj ,
ε, if âi 6= aj ,
where ε > 0 is a small constant. As will be clear, we focus on a different class of private
monitoring distributions.
In an important article, Sekiguchi (1997) constructed an efficient equilibrium for
the almost-perfect conditionally-independent case (as well as for correlated but almost-
perfect monitoring). Let Wi = {we, wn}, σi(wn, âi) = wn for all âi, σi(we, êi) = we,
and σi(we, n̂i) = wn. The pure strategy of grim trigger (begin playing ei, and continue
to play ei as long as êi is observed, switch to ni after n̂i and always play ni thereafter)
is induced by the initial state w1i = w
e. The pure strategy of always play ni is induced
by the initial state w1i = w
n. The critical insight in Sekiguchi (1997) is that while
grim trigger is not a Nash equilibrium of this game, the symmetric mixed strategy
profile where each player independently randomizes over initial states we and wn is an
equilibrium (as long as δ is not too close to 1). Sekiguchi (1997) then constructs an
equilibrium for larger δ by treating the game as M distinct games, with the kth game
played in periods t + kM , for t ∈ ℵ. The mixed equilibrium for M = 3 is constructed
7Here (and in other examples) we follow the literature in assuming the ex ante payoff matrix is
independent of the monitoring distribution. This simplifies the discussion and is without loss of gener-
ality: Ex ante payoffs are close when the monitoring distributions are close (Lemma 4) and all relevant
incentive constraints are strict.
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Figure 2: The automaton described the pure strategies in Sekiguchi (1997) for M = 3.
The decision rules are di(wabc) = ai. Unlabeled arrows are unconditional transitions.
from the machine in Figure 2. The state wene for example corresponds to grim trigger
in “games” 1 and 3, and always ni in game 2.
2.2. Public-Monitoring Games
We turn now to the benchmark public-monitoring game for our games with private
monitoring. The finite action set for player i ∈ N is again Ai. The public signal is
denoted y and is drawn from a finite set Y . The probability that the signal y occurs
when the action profile a ∈ A ≡ ∏i Ai is chosen is denoted ρ(y|a). We refer to (Y, ρ) as
the public-monitoring distribution. Player i’s payoff after the realization (y, a) is given




i (y, ai) ρ (y|a). The
infinitely repeated game with public monitoring is the infinite repetition of this stage
game in which at the end of the period each player learns only the realized value of the
signal y. Players do not receive any other information about the behavior of the other
players. All players use the same discount factor, δ.
A strategy for player i is public if, in every period t, it only depends on the public
history ht ∈ Y t−1, and not on i’s private history.8 Henceforth, by the term public
profile, we will always mean a strategy profile for the public-monitoring game that is
itself public. A perfect public equilibrium (PPE) is a profile of public strategies that,
after observing any public history ht, specifies a Nash equilibrium for the repeated game.
8Note that strategies of public-monitoring games are public if and only if they are action-free when
we view the public-monitoring game as a game with (trivial) private monitoring.
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Under imperfect full-support public monitoring, every public history arises with positive
probability, and so every Nash equilibrium in public strategies is a PPE.
Any pure public strategy profile can be described as an automaton as follows: There
is a set of states, W , an initial state, w1 ∈ W , a transition function σ : W × Y → W ,
and a collection of decision rules, di : W → Ai. In the first period, player i chooses




. The vector of actions, a1, then generates a signal y1 according to
the distribution ρ









, and so on. Since we can take W to be the set of all histories of
the public signal, ∪k≥0Y k, W is at most countably infinite. A public profile is finite if W
is a finite set. Note that, given a pure strategy profile (and the associated automaton),
continuation play after any history is determined by the public state reached by that
history. In games with private monitoring, by contrast, given an action-free strategy
profile (and the associated automaton), a sufficient statistic for continuation play after
any history is the vector of current private states, one for each player.
Denote the vector of average discounted expected values of following the public
profile (W,w, σ, d) (i.e., the initial state is w) by φ(w). Define a function g : A×W → W
by g(a; w) ≡ (1 − δ)u(a) + δ ∑y φ (σ (w, y)) ρ(y|a). We have (from Abreu, Pearce, and
Stacchetti (1990)), that if the profile is an equilibrium, then, for all w ∈ W , the action
profile (d1(w), . . . , dN (w)) ≡ d (w) is a pure strategy equilibrium of the static game with





describes an equilibrium of the static game with payoffs
g (·; w) for all w ∈ W , then the induced pure strategy profile in the infinitely repeated
game with public monitoring is an equilibrium.9 A PPE (W,w1, σ, d) is strict if, for all
w ∈ W , d(w) is a strict Nash equilibrium of the static game g (· :; w).10
A maintained assumption throughout our analysis is that the public monitoring has
full support.
Assumption 1 ρ (y|a) > 0 for all y ∈ Y and all a ∈ A.
Definition 2 An automaton is minimal if for every pair of states w, ŵ ∈ W , there
exists a sequence of signals y1, . . . , yL such that for some i, di(σ(y1, . . . , yL;w)) 6=




. . . , σ(y1, w)
))
.
9We have introduced a distinction between W and the set of continuation payoffs for convenience.
Any pure strategy equilibrium payoff can be supported by an equilibrium where W ⊂ <I and φ (w) = w
(again, see Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990)).
10Equivalently, a PPE is strict if each player strictly prefers his equilibrium strategy to every other
public strategy. For a large class of public-monitoring games, strictness is without loss of generality,
in that a folk theorem holds for strict PPE (Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994, Theorem 6.4 and
remark)).
9
The restriction to minimal automata is without loss of generality: every profile has
a minimal representing automaton.
3. Almost-Public Monitoring
3.1. Minimally-private almost-public monitoring
Games with public monitoring (Y, ρ) are nested within games with private monitoring,
since public monitoring simply means that all players always observe the same signal,
i.e., Ωi = Ωj = Y , and π (y, . . . , y|a) = ρ (y|a) for all a. Mailath and Morris (2002)
discussed the case of minimally-private monitoring, in the sense that there is a public
monitoring distribution (Y, ρ) with Ωi = Y and π close to ρ:
Definition 3 A private-monitoring game (u∗, (Y n, π)) is ε-close to a public-monitoring
game (ũ∗, (Y, ρ)), if |ũ∗i (y, ai)− u∗i (y, ai)| < ε and |π ((y, . . . , y) |a)− ρ (y|a)| < ε for all
i ∈ N , y ∈ Y and all a ∈ A. We also say that such a private-monitoring game has
minimally-private almost-public monitoring.





∣∣∣ < η. In other words, the ex
ante stage payoffs of any minimally-private almost-public-monitoring game are close to
the ex ante stage payoffs of the benchmark public-monitoring game.
An important implication of the assumption that the public monitoring has full
support is that when a player observes a private signal y, (for ε small) that player
assigns high probability to all other players also observing the same signal, irrespective
of the actions taken. Since the proof is immediate, it is omitted.
Lemma 2 Fix a full support public monitoring distribution ρ and η > 0. There exists
ε > 0 such that if π is ε-close to ρ, then for all a ∈ A and y ∈ Y ,
πi (y1|a, y) > 1− η.
A public strategy profile (W,w1, σ, d) in the public-monitoring game induces a strat-
egy profile (s1, . . . , sn) in minimally-private almost-public-monitoring games in the ob-





i ) = di(σ(w
1, y1i )) ≡ di(w2i ), and defining states re-





i). This private strategy is, of course, action-free.
If W is finite, each player can be viewed as following a finite state automaton.
Hopefully without confusion, when we can take the initial state as given, we abuse
notation and write wti = σ(w
1, hti) = σ(h
t
i). We describe w
t
i as player i’s private state
in period t. It is important to note that while all players are in the same private
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state in the first period, since the signals are private, after the first period, different
players may be in different private states. The private profile is the translation to the
private-monitoring game of the public profile (of the public-monitoring game).
If player i believes that the other players are following a strategy that was induced
by a public profile, then a sufficient statistic of hti for the purposes of evaluating contin-
uation strategies is player i’s private state and i’s beliefs over the other players’ private




i ∈ ∆(WN−1). In principle, W may be quite large. For
example, if the public strategy profile is nonstationary, it may be necessary to take W
to be the set of all histories of the public signal, ∪k≥0Y k. On the other hand, the strat-
egy profiles typically studied can be described with a significantly more parsimonious
collection of states, often finite. When W is finite, the need to only keep track of each
player’s private state and that player’s beliefs over the other players’ private states is a
considerable simplification, as the following result (Mailath and Morris (2002, Theorem
4.2)) demonstrates.
Theorem 1 Suppose the public profile (W,w1, σ, d) is a strict equilibrium of the full-
support public-monitoring game for some δ and |W | < ∞. For all κ > 0, there exists
η and ε such that in any game with minimally-private almost-public monitoring, if the




1|hti) > 1 − η for all
hti = (di(w








i ), where w
τ+1
i ≡ σ(wτi , yti), and if π is
ε-close to ρ, then the private profile is a Nash equilibrium of the game with private
monitoring for the same δ and the expected payoff in that equilibrium is within κ of the
public equilibrium payoff.
Example 2 We return to the repeated prisoners’ dilemma, with ex ante stage game
given by Figure 1 (recall footnote 7). In the benchmark public-monitoring game, the





p, if a1a2 = e1e2
q, if a1a2 = e1n2 or n1e2,
r, if a1a2 = n1n2.
The grim trigger strategy profile for the public-monitoring game is described by the




we, if y = ȳ and w = we,
wn, otherwise.
Grim trigger is a strict PPE if δ > (3p−2q)−1 > 0 (a condition we maintain throughout
this example). We turn now to minimally-private-monitoring games that are ε-close to
this public-monitoring game. It turns out that, for ε small, grim trigger induces a Nash
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equilibrium in such games if q < r, but not if q > r. Consider first the case q > r and
the private history (e1y1, n1ȳ1, n1ȳ1, . . . , n1ȳ1). We now argue that, after a sufficiently
long such history, the grim trigger specification of n1 is not optimal. Intuitively, while
player 1 has transited to the private state wn1 , player 1 always puts strictly positive (but
perhaps small) probability on his opponent being in private state we2. Since q > r (and ε
is small), the private signal ȳ1 after playing n1 is an indication that player 2 had played
e2 (rather than n2), and so player 1’s posterior that player 2 is still in we2 increases.
Eventually, player 1 is sufficiently confident of player 2 still being in we2 that he finds
n1 suboptimal. On the other hand, when q ≤ r, such a history is not problematic
because it reinforces 1’s belief that 2 is also in wn2 . Two other histories are worthy
of mention: (e1y1, n1y1, n1y1, . . . , n1y1) and (e1ȳ1, e1ȳ1, e1ȳ1, . . . , e1ȳ1). Under the first
history, while the signal y
1
is now a signal that 2 had chosen e2 in the previous period,
for ε small, 1 is confident that 2 also observed y
2
and so will transit to wn2 . For the final
history, the signal ȳ1 continually reassures 1 that 2 is still playing e2, and so e1 remains
optimal. (See Mailath and Morris (2002, Section 3.3) for the calculations underlying
this discussion.)
Example 3 As the players become patient, the payoffs from grim trigger converge to
(0, 0). A grim trigger profile (i.e., a profile in which the specification of ni is absorbing)
can only achieve significant payoffs for patient players by being forgiving.11 Such a
profile provides a different example of how a strict PPE can fail to induce a Nash
equilibrium in close-by minimally-private-monitoring games. The simplest forgiving
profile requires two realizations of y to switch to n1n2. The automaton for this profile
has a set of states W = {we, ŵe, wn}, initial state we, decision rules di(wa) = ai and





we, if y = ȳ and w = we,
ŵe, if y = y and w = we or y = ȳ and w = ŵe,
wn, otherwise.
The profile is illustrated in Figure 3. This PPE never induces a Nash equilibrium in
close-by minimally-private-monitoring games: consider a private history in which player
1 plays e1 and observes ȳ1 for T periods, and then observes y1. Under the forgiving
profile, player 1 is supposed switch to the private state ŵe1 and continue to play e1 (until
another y
1
is observed). But, for large T , it is more likely that player 2 has observed
y
2
in exactly one of the first T periods than having observed ȳ2 in every period.12
11This is the class of profiles studied by Compte (2002) for the conditionally-independent private-
monitoring prisoners’ dilemma.
12This type of drift of beliefs is a general phenomenon when players choose the same action in adjacent















Figure 4: Forgiving grim trigger where two successive realizations of y lead to wn.
Consequently, for large T , player 1 will not find e1 optimal. Clearly, the same analysis
applies to forgiving grim triggers that require more realizations of y to switch to wn.
Another class of forgiving grim trigger profiles require successive realizations of y to
switch to wn. In the three state version, the automaton is identical to that above except
σ(ŵe, ȳ) = we (see Figure 4). The analysis of this profile is similar to that of Example 2.
The profile does not induce a Nash equilibrium in close-by minimally-private-monitoring
games if q > r for similar reasons. There are now two possibilities for the case q ≤ r,
since isolated observations of y
1
do not lead to wn2 . For the histories considered in
Example 2, the same argument applies once we note that, conditional on players being
in one of we or ŵe, a player assigns very high probability to the other player being in
the same state, since this is determined by the last signal. The remaining histories are
those with isolated observations of y
1
. The critical history (since it contains the largest
fraction of y
1
’s consistent with e1) is (e1ȳ1, e1y1, e1ȳ1, e1y1, . . . , e1ȳ1), that is, alternating
y
1
and ȳ1. If p(1 − p) ≥ q(1 − q), then such a history (weakly) indicates that player 2
is still playing e2, while the reverse strict inequality indicates that player 2 is playing
n2. Summarizing, the profile induces a Nash equilibrium in close-by minimally-private-
monitoring games if and only if q ≤ r and p(1− p) ≥ q(1− q).
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3.2. General almost-public monitoring
We now turn to the most general private monitoring structure that nonetheless preserves
the essential characteristics of both Definition 3 and Lemma 2.13
Definition 4 The private monitoring distribution (Ω, π) is ε-close to the public mon-
itoring distribution (Y, ρ) if there exist signaling functions fi : Ωi → Y ∪ {∅} such
that
1. for each a ∈ A and y ∈ Y ,
∣∣∣∣π ({ω : fi (ωi) = y for all i}| a)− ρ (y| a)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε,
and
2. for all y ∈ Y , ωi ∈ f−1i (y), and all a ∈ A,
π ({ω−i : fj (ωj) = y for all j 6= i}| (a, ωi)) ≥ 1− ε.
The private monitoring distribution (Ω, π) is strongly ε-close to the public monitoring
distribution (Y, ρ) if it is ε-close, and in addition, all the signaling functions map into
Y .
If the private monitoring is ε-close, but not strongly ε-close, then some private signals
are not associated with any public signal: there is a signal ωi satisfying fi (ωi) = ∅.
Such an “uninterpretable” signal may contain no information about the signals observed
by the other players.
Note that the second condition implies that every player has at least one private
signal mapped to each public signal. Moreover, for the case Ωi = Y , the first condition
implies the second (Lemma 2).
The condition of ε-closeness in Definition 4 can be restated as follows. Recall from
Monderer and Samet (1989) that an event is p-evident if, whenever it is true, everyone
assigns probability at least p to it being true. The following Lemma is a straightforward
application of the definitions, and so we omit the proof.
13While there is a connection to informational smallness (see, for example, McLean and Postlewaite
(2004)), these are distinct notions. For concreteness, suppose ωi is a noisy signal of y. Then, (Ω, π)
is ε-close to (Y, ρ) if and only if the private signal is a sufficiently accurate signal of y. A player is
informationally small if the posterior on y, conditional on the other players’ private signals, on average
does not vary too much with that player’s private signal. Even if each player’s private signal is very
accurate, the posterior can vary dramatically in a player’s signal if that player’s signal is sufficiently
accurate relative to the other players. Moreover, if there are many players, even when signals are very





(1− α) (1− 3ε) ε
ȳ′1 ε α
′ (1− 3ε)
ȳ′′1 ε (α− α′) (1− 3ε)
Figure 5: The probability distribution of the private signals for Example 4. The distri-
bution is given as a function of the action profile a1a2, where α = p if a1a2 = e1e2, q if
a1a2 = e1n2 or n1e2, and r if a1a2 = n1n2 (analogously, α′ is given by p′, q′, or r′ as a
function of a1a2).
Lemma 3 The private monitoring distribution (Ω, π) is ε-close to the public monitoring
distribution (Y, ρ) if and only if there are signaling functions fi : Ωi → Y ∪ {∅} such
that for each public signal y, the set of private signal profiles {ω : fi (ωi) = y for all i}
is (1− ε)-evident (conditional on any action profile) and has probability within ε of the
probability of y (conditional on that action profile).





1}, keeping player 2 signals unchanged, Ω2 = {y2, ȳ2}. The probability dis-
tribution of the signals is given in Figure 5. This private-monitoring distribution is
ε-close to the public-monitoring distribution of Example 2 using the signaling func-




1) = ȳ. Note that even for ε small, the
only restriction on the values of p′, q′, and r′ is that they be smaller than p, q, and r
(respectively).
Definition 5 A private-monitoring game (u∗, (Ω, π)) is ε-close to a public-monitoring
game (ũ∗, (Y, ρ)), if (Ω, π) is ε-close to (Y, ρ) (with associated signaling functions (f1, . . . , fn))
and |ũ∗i (fi(ωi), ai)− u∗i (ωi, ai)| < ε for all i ∈ N , ai ∈ Ai, and ωi ∈ f−1i (Y ). We will
also say that such a private-monitoring game has almost-public monitoring.
As above, the ex ante stage payoffs of any almost-public-monitoring game are close
to the ex ante stage payoffs of the benchmark public-monitoring game (the proof is in
the Appendix).
Lemma 4 For all η > 0, there is ε > 0 such that if (u∗, (Ω, π)) is ε-close to (ũ∗, (Y, ρ)),
then










of a full-support public-monitoring game (ũ∗, (Y, ρ)),
and a strongly ε-close private-monitoring game (u∗, (Ω, π)). The public profile induces
a private profile in the private-monitoring game in a natural way: Player i’s strategy is
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described by the automaton (W,w1, σi, di), where σi(w,ωi) = σ(w, fi(ωi)) for all ωi ∈ Ωi
and w ∈ W . The set of states, initial state, and decision function are from the public
profile. The transition function σi is well-defined, because the signaling functions all
map into Y , rather than Y ∪ {∅}. As for games with minimally-private almost-public
monitoring, if player i believes that the other players are following a strategy induced
by a public profile, a sufficient statistic of hti for the purposes of evaluating continuation











. Finally, we can recursively calculate the private
states of player i as w2i = σ(w
1, fi(ω1i )) = σi(w






i ), and so on. Thus,





Example 5 In Example 2, we argued that if q < r, grim trigger induces Nash equi-
librium behavior in close-by minimally-private-monitoring games. We now argue that
under the private monitoring distribution of Example 4, even if q < r, grim trigger
will not induce a Nash equilibrium behavior in some close-by games. In particular,
suppose 0 < r′ < q′ < q < r. Under this parameter restriction, the signal ȳ′′1 after n1
is indeed a signal that player 2 had also played n2. However, the signal ȳ′1 after n1





1, . . . , n1ȳ
′
1) will lead to a posterior for player 1 at which n1 is not
optimal.
4. PPE with bounded recall
As we saw in Example 5, arbitrary public equilibria need not induce equilibria of almost-
public-monitoring games, because the public state in period t is determined, in principle,
by the entire history ht. For profiles that have bounded recall, the entire history is not
needed, and equilibria in bounded recall strategies will induce equilibria in almost-
public-monitoring games.14
Definition 6 A public profile s has bounded recall if there exists L such that for all







The following characterization of bounded recall (proved in the Appendix) is useful.
14Mailath and Morris (2002) used the term bounded memory for public profiles with the prop-









y, yL, . . . , y2

for all y ∈ Y , and w1 = (∗, . . . , ∗). Our earlier notion im-
plicitly imposes a time homogeneity condition, since the caveat in Lemma 5 that the two states should
be reachable in the same period is missing. The strategy profile in which play alternates between the
same two action profiles in odd and even periods has bounded recall, but not bounded memory.
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Lemma 5 The public profile induced by the minimal automaton (W,w1, σ, d) has bounded
recall if and only if there exists L such that for all w, w′ ∈ W reachable in the same
period and for all h ∈ Y ∞,
σ(w, hL) = σ(w′, hL).




. Fix a private mon-
itoring technology (Ω, π) with associated signaling functions fi that is ε-close to (Y, ρ).
Following Monderer and Samet (1989), we first consider a constrained game where
behavior after “uninterpretable signals” is arbitrarily fixed. Define the set of “uninter-




i ∈ f−1i (∅) , some τ satisfying t− L ≤ τ ≤ t− 1
}
.
This is the set of private histories for which in any of the last L periods, a private signal
ωτi satisfying fi (ω
τ
i ) = ∅ is observed. We fix arbitrarily player i’s action after any
private history hti ∈ Hui . For any private history that is not uninterpretable, each of the
last L observations of the private signal can be associated with a public signal by the




the private state so obtained. That is,
wi(hti) = (fi(ω
t−1
i ), . . . , fi(ω
t−L
i )),
for all hti /∈ Hui . We are then left with a game in which in period t ≥ 2 player i only
chooses an action after a signal ωt−1i yields a private history not in H
u
i . We claim
that for ε sufficiently small, the profile (ŝ1, . . . , ŝN ) is an equilibrium of this constrained





di(w1i ), if t = 1,
di(wi(hti)), if t > 1 and h
t
i /∈ Hui .
But this follows from arguments almost identical to that in the proofs of Mailath and
Morris (2002, Theorems 4.2 and 4.3): since a player’s behavior depends only on the
last L signals, for small ε, after observing a history hti /∈ Hui , player i assigns a high
probability to player j observing a signal that leads to the same private state. The
crucial point is that for ε small, the specification of behavior after signals ωi satisfying
fi(ωi) = ∅ is irrelevant for behavior at signals ωi satisfying fi(ωi) ∈ Y . It remains
to specify optimal behavior after signals ωi satisfying fi(ωi) = ∅. So, consider a new
constrained game where player i is required to follow ŝi where possible. This constrained
game has an equilibrium, and so by construction, we thus have an equilibrium of the
unconstrained game. We have thus proved:
Theorem 2 Fix a full-support public-monitoring game (ũ∗, (Y, ρ)) and a strict public
perfect equilibrium, s̃, with bounded recall L. There exists ε > 0 such that for all private-
monitoring games (u∗, (Ω, π)) ε-close to (ũ∗, (Y, ρ)),
1. if fi(Ωi) = Y for all i, the induced private profile is a Nash equilibrium; and
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2. if fi(Ωi) 6= Y for some i, there is a Nash equilibrium of the private-monitoring
game, s, such that, for all ht = (y1, . . . , yt−1) and htj = (ω
1
j , . . . , ω
t−1
j ), if t > L
and yτ = fj(ωτj ) for τ = t− L, . . . , t− 1, then
sj(htj) = s̃j(h
t)
for all j. Moreover, for all κ > 0, ε can be chosen sufficiently small that the
expected payoff to each player under s is within κ of their public equilibrium payoff.
We could similarly extend our results on patiently-strict, connected, finite public
profiles (Mailath and Morris (2002, Theorem 5.1)) and on the almost-public almost-
perfect folk theorem (Mailath and Morris (2002, Theorem 6.1)) to this more general
notion of nearby private-monitoring distributions.
5. Failure of Coordination
Example 5 illustrates that the updating in almost-public-monitoring games can be very
different than would be expected from the underlying public-monitoring game. In this
section, we build on that example to show that when the set of signals is sufficiently
rich (in a sense to be defined), many profiles fail to induce equilibrium behavior in
almost-public-monitoring games.
Our negative results are based on the following converse to Theorem 1 (the proof is
in the Appendix). Since the theorem is negative, the assumption of strong ε-closeness
enhances the usefulness of the result.15




is a strict equilibrium of the full-
support public-monitoring game (ũ∗, (Y, ρ)) for some δ and |W | < ∞. There exists
η > 0 and ε > 0 such that for any game with private monitoring (u∗, (Ω, π)) strongly
ε-close to (ũ∗, (Y, ρ)), if there exists a player i, a private history for that player hti, and




> 1− η, then the induced private
profile is not a Nash equilibrium of the game with private monitoring for the same δ.
We implicitly used this result in our discussions of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma.
For example, in Example 5, we argued that there was a private history for player 1 that
15While we have stated this theorem, and Theorem 4 below, for pure strategies, they also hold for
some mixed strategy profiles. Recall from Section 2.1 that given an automaton (W, di, σi) describing
a collection of pure strategies for player i (taking any state w ∈ W as the initial state gives a pure
strategy), a probability distribution over W gives a mixed strategy. Consider now a mixed strategy
PPE of the game with public-monitoring. Clearly, such a profile cannot be strict. However, there
may exist a period T , such that all the incentive constraints after period T are strict (the equilibria in
Sekiguchi (1997) are important examples). In that case, Theorem 3 holds if the hypotheses are satisfied
for t ≥ T .
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leaves him in the private state wn1 , but his posterior after that history assigns probability
close to 1 that player 2’s private state is we2.
Our approach is to ask when it is possible to so “manipulate” a player’s beliefs
through selection of private history that the hypotheses of Theorem 3 are satisfied.
In particular, we are interested in the weakest independent conditions on the private-
monitoring distributions and on the strategy profiles that would allow such manipula-
tion.
Fix a PPE of the public-monitoring game and a close-by almost-public-monitoring
game. The logic of Example 5 runs as follows: Consider a player i in a private state
ŵ who assigns strictly positive (albeit small) probability to all the other players being
in some other common private state w̄ 6= ŵ (full-support private monitoring ensures
that such an occurrence arises with positive probability). Let ã = (di(ŵ), d−i(w̄)) be
the action profile that results when i is in state ŵ and all the other players are in state
w̄. Suppose that if any other player is in a different private state w 6= w̄, then the
resulting action profile differs from ã. Suppose, moreover, there is a signal y such that
ŵ = σ(ŵ, y) and w̄ = σ(w̄, y), that is, any player in the state ŵ or w̄ observing a
private signal consistent with y stays in that private state (and so the profile cannot
have bounded recall, see Lemma 5). Suppose finally there is a private signal ωi for
player i consistent with y that is more likely to have come from ã than any other action
profile, i.e., ωi ∈ f−1i (y) and (where πi(ωi|a) is the probability that player i observes
the signal ωi under a)
πi(ωi|ã) > πi(ωi|(di(ŵ), a′−i)) ∀a′−i 6= d−i(w̄). (1)
Then, after observing the private signal ωi, player i’s posterior probability that all
the other players are in w̄ should increase (this is not immediate, however, since the
monitoring is private). Moreover, since players in ŵ and w̄ do not change their private
states, we can make player i’s posterior probability that all the other players are in w̄
as close to one as we like. If di(ŵ) 6= di(w̄), an application of Theorem 3 shows that the
induced private profile is not an equilibrium.
The suppositions in the above logic can be weakened in two ways. First, it is not
necessary that the same private signal ωi be more likely to have come from ã than any
other action profile. It should be enough if for each action profile different from ã, there
is a private signal more likely to have come from ã than that profile, as long as the signal
not mess up the other inferences too badly. In that case, realizations of the other signals
could undo any damage done without negatively impacting on the overall inferences.
For example, suppose there are two players, with player 1 the player whose beliefs we are
“manipulating,” and in addition to state w̄, player 2 could be in state ŵ or w. Suppose
also A2 = {ã2, a′2, a′′2}. We would like the odds ratio Pr(w2 6= w̄|ht1)/Pr(w2 = w̄|ht1)
to converge to zero as t → ∞, for appropriate private histories. Let ã1 = d1(ŵ),
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ã2 = d2(w̄), a′2 = d2(ŵ), and a
′′
2 = d2(w), and suppose there are two private signals, ω
′
1
and ω′′1 , satisfying
π1(ω′1|ã1, a′′2) > π1(ω′1|ã) > π1(ω′1|ã1, a′2)
and
π1(ω′′1 |ã1, a′2) > π1(ω′′1 |ã) > π1(ω′′1 |ã1, a′′2).
Then, after observing the private signal ω′1, we have
Pr(w2 = ŵ|ht1, ω′1)









as desired, but Pr(w2 = w|ht1, ω′1)/Pr(w2 = w̄|ht1, ω′1) increased. On the other hand,
after observing the private signal ω′′1 , while the odds ratio Pr(w2 = w|ht1, ω′′1)/Pr(w2 =
w̄|ht1, ω′′1) falls, Pr(w2 = ŵ|ht1, ω′′1)/Pr(w2 = w̄|ht1, ω′′1) increases. However, it may be
that the increases can be offset by appropriate decreases, so that, for example, ω′1
followed by two realizations of ω′′1 results in a decrease in both odds ratios. If so, a




1 result in Pr(w2 6= w̄|ht1)/Pr(w2 =
w̄|ht1) being close to zero.




1 lowers both odds ratios
















Our richness condition on private monitoring distributions captures this idea. For a
private monitoring distribution, (Ω, π), define γaa′−i(ωi) ≡ log πi(ωi|ai, a−i)−log πi(ωi|ai, a′−i),





denote the vector in <|A−i|−1 of the log odds
ratios of the signal ωi associated with different action profiles. The last two displayed






1) > 0, where 0 is the 2 × 1 zero
vector.16
Definition 7 A private-monitoring distribution (Ω, π) is rich if for all y ∈ Y , the con-
vex hull of the set of vectors {γa (ωi) : ωi ∈ f−1i (y) and πi(ωi|ai, a′−i) > 0 for all a′−i ∈
A−i} has a nonempty intersection with <|A−i|−1++ .
16The convex combination is strictly positive (rather than negative) because the definition of γaa′−i
inverts the odds ratios from the displayed equations.
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It will be useful to quantify the extent to which the conditions of Definition 7 are
satisfied. Since the space of signals and actions are finite, there are a finite number of
constraints in Definition 7, and so for any rich private monitoring distribution, the set
of ζ over which the supremum is taken in the next definition is non-empty.17
Definition 8 The richness of a rich private-monitoring distribution (Ω, π) is the supre-
mum of all ζ > 0 satisfying: for all y ∈ Y , the convex hull of the set of vectors
{γa (ωi) : ωi ∈ f−1i (y) and πi(ωi|ai, a′−i) ≥ ζ for all a′−i ∈ A−i} has a nonempty inter-
section with <|A−i|−1ζ ≡ {x ∈ <
|A−i|−1
++ : xk ≥ ζ for k = 1, . . . , |A−i| − 1}.
The second weakening concerns the nature of the strategy profile. The logic assumed
that there is a signal y such that ŵ = σ(ŵ, y) and w̄ = σ(w̄, y). If there were only two
states, ŵ and w̄, it would clearly be enough that there be a finite sequence of signals such
that both ŵ and w̄ cycle. When there are more states, we also need to worry about
what happens to the other states. In addition, we need to allow for time-dependent
profiles, and profiles that use some states for only a finite time. Let Wt be the set
of states reachable in period t, Wt ≡ {w ∈ W : w = σ(w1, y1, y2, . . . , yt−1) for some
(y1, y2, . . . , yt−1), where w1 is the initial state}. Define R(w̃) as the set of states that
are repeatedly reachable in the same period as w̃ (i.e., R(w̃) = {w ∈ W : {w, w̃} ⊂ Wt
infinitely often}).
We generalize the cycling idea to the notion that there be a path that allows some
distinguished state to be separated from every other state that could ever be reached.
Given an outcome path h ≡ (y1, y2, . . .) ∈ Y ∞, let τh ≡ (yτ , yτ+1, . . .) ∈ Y ∞ denote the
outcome path from period τ , so that h = (hτ ,τh) and τhτ+t = (yτ , yτ+1, . . . , yτ+t−1).
Definition 9 The public strategy profile is separating if there is some state w̃ and an
outcome path h ∈ Y ∞ such that there is another state w ∈ R(w̃) that satisfies σ(w, ht) 6=
σ(w̃, ht) for all t, and for all τ and w ∈ R(σ(w̃, hτ )), if σ(w,τhτ+t) 6= σ(w̃, hτ+t) for all
t ≥ 0, then
di(σ(w,τhτ+t)) 6= di(σ(w̃, hτ+t)) infinitely often, for all i.
When the set of states is finite, the outcome path in Definition 9 can be chosen so
that it satisfies a critical stronger cycling condition (Lemma 6).
Clearly, a separating profile cannot have bounded recall. Moreover, it is easy to con-
struct PPE that neither have bounded recall nor are separating (Example 6). Nonethe-
less, we are not aware of any strict PPE of substantive interest that neither have bounded
recall nor are separating.
17The bound ζ appears twice in the definition. Its first appearance ensures that for all ζ > 0, there
is uniform upper bound on the number of private signals satisfying πi(ωi|ai, a′−i) ≥ ζ in any private-
monitoring distribution with a richness of at least ζ.
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A B C
A 3, 3 0, 0 0, 0
B 0, 0 3, 3 0, 0
C 0, 0 0, 0 2, 2











Figure 7: The strategy profile for Example 6. In states wA and ŵA, the action A is
played, while in wB the action B and in wC , the action C is played.
Example 6 The stage game is given in Figure 6. In the public-monitoring game, there
are two public signals, y′ and y′′, with distribution (0 < q < p < 1)
ρ(y′′|a1a2) =
{
p, if a1 = a2,
q, otherwise.
Finally, the public profile is illustrated in Figure 7. This profile is not separating: Under
any path in which y′ appears at least twice, all states transit to the same state. Under
the remaining paths, only wA and ŵA appear. The definition of separation fails because
play is the same at states wA and ŵA.
The profile is also not robust: After enough realizations of private signals corre-
sponding to y′′, beliefs must assign roughly equal probability to wA and ŵA,18 and so
18This is most easily seen by considering the Markov chain describing player 2’s private state transi-
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after the first realization of a private signal corresponding to y′, B is the only best reply
(even if the current state is wC). This example (like the second forgiving grim trigger
of Example 3) illustrates the possibility that beliefs over private states can drift to a
stationary distribution when play is identical in different states.
It remains to ensure that, under private monitoring, players may transit to different
states. It suffices to assume the following, weaker than full-support, condition:19
Definition 10 A private monitoring distribution (Ω, π) that is ε-close to a public mon-
itoring distribution (Y, ρ) has essentially full support if for all (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Y n,
π{(ω1, . . . , ωn) ∈ Ω : fi(ωi) = yi} > 0.
Theorem 4 Fix a separating strict finite PPE of a full-support public-monitoring game
(ũ∗, (Y, ρ)). For all ζ > 0, there exists ε′ > 0 such that for all ε < ε′, if (u, (Ω, π)) is
a private-monitoring game strongly ε-close to (ũ∗, (Y, ρ)) with (Ω, π) having richness
at least ζ and essentially full support, then the induced private profile is not a Nash
equilibrium of the private monitoring game.
It is worth noting that the bound on ε is only a function of the richness of the private
monitoring. It is independent of the probability that a disagreement in private states
arises. By considering finite state profiles that are separating, not only is the difficulty
identified in the Introduction dealt with (as we discuss at the end of the next Section),
but we can accommodate arbitrarily small probabilities of disagreement.
Thus, separating strict PPE of public-monitoring games are not robust to the in-
troduction of private monitoring.20 It, of course, also implies that separating behavior
in the private-monitoring game typically cannot coordinate continuation play in the
following sense. Say a profile is ε-strict if all the incentive constraints are satisfied by
at least ε. (The result follows immediately from upperhemicontinuity and Theorem 4.)
Corollary 1 Suppose {(uk, (Ω, πk))} is a sequence of private-monitoring games, with
(uk, (Ω, πk)) 1/k-close to some public-monitoring game (ũ∗, (Y, ρ)) and {(Ω, πk)} a rich
sequence of distributions. Fix a pure strategy profile of the private monitoring game
in which each player’s strategy respects his signaling function fi (i.e., σi(hi, ai, ωi) =
tions conditional on player 1 always playing A and always observing the same private signal consistent
with y′′ (a Markov chain is associated with each ω1 ∈ f1(y′′)). Each such Markov chain is ergodic, and
so has a unique stationary distribution. A straightforward calculation shows that, in the limit (as the




19If an essentially-full-support private monitoring distribution does not have full support, Nash equi-
libria of the private-monitoring game may not have realization-equivalent sequentially-rational strategy
profiles (recall Remark 2).
20The extension to mixed strategies described in footnote 15 also holds for Theorem 4.
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σi(hi, ai, ω̂i) if fi(ωi) = fi(ω̂i) 6= ∅). Suppose this profile is separating (when interpreted
as a public profile). For all ε > 0, there exists k′ such that for k > k′, this profile is not
an ε-strict Nash equilibrium.
Since the equilibrium failure of separating profiles seem to arise after private histories
that have low probability, an attractive conjecture is that equilibrium can be restored
by appropriately modifying the profile at only the problematic histories. Unfortunately,
such a modification, would appear to require additional modifications to the profile,
destroying the connection to the public-monitoring game.
6. The Proof of Theorem 4
We first show that separating profiles can be treated as if they cycle under the separating
outcome path.
Lemma 6 For any finite separating public strategy profile of the public-monitoring
game, there is a finite sequence of signals ȳ1, . . . , ȳm, a collection of states Wc, and
a state w̄ ∈ Wc such that
1. σ(w, ȳ1, . . . , ȳm) = w for all w ∈ Wc,
2. σ(w, ȳ1, . . . , ȳm) ∈ Wc for all w ∈ R(w̄),
3. ∀w ∈ Wc\{w̄}, ∀i ∃k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, such that
di(σ(w, ȳ1, . . . , ȳk) 6= di(σ(w̄, ȳ1, . . . , ȳk),
and
4. for some i and ŵ ∈ Wc\{w̄}, di(ŵ) 6= di(w̄).
Proof. Given the outcome path h ∈ Y ∞ and state w̃ from the definition of separa-
tion, σ(w, ht) denotes the state reached after the first t − 1 signals in h from the state
w.
The idea is to construct the set Wc by iteratively adding the states necessary to
satisfy parts 1 and 2; parts 3 and 4 will then be implications of separation. We start
by considering all states reached infinitely often from states in R(w̃) along h. While
this implies a cycle of those states, there is no guarantee that other states reachable in
the same period will be mapped into the cycle. Accordingly, we include states that are
reached infinitely often from states that are reachable under any history in the same
period as the states just identified, and so on. Proceeding in this way, we will construct
a set of states and a finite sequence of signals with the properties that the states cycle
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under the sequence, and every state that could arise is mapped under the finite sequence
of signals to a cycling state.




w∈R(w̃) ∈ WR(w̃). Since
W is finite, so is WR(w̃), and there exists T 11 such that for all τ ≥ T 11 , w1(τ) appears




1 ) : w ∈ R(w̃)
}
, i.e., W 1
is the collection of states that can be reached in period T 11 under h, starting from any
state in R(w̃). Separation implies
∣∣W 1∣∣ ≥ 2. By the definition of T 11 , there exists an
increasing sequence {T k1 }∞k=2, with T k1 →∞ as k →∞, satisfying, for all k ≥ 2,
w1(T k1 ) = w
1(T 11 ),
and for all t ≥ T 11 and k ≥ 1, there exists a period τ with T k1 < τ ≤ T k+11 such that
w1(t) = w1(τ).
The first displayed equation implies that for all w ∈ W 1, σ(w,T 11hT k1 ) = w for all k. The
second implies that for any state w in R(w̃) and any t ≥ T 11 , the state w′ = σ(w, ht)
appears at least once between each pair of dates T k1 and T
k+1
1 , for all k. For t ≥ T 11 ,
w1(t) has







∈ WW 1 .







for t ≥ T 1κ . The recursive step begins with a set of states W κ and an
increasing sequence {T kκ }∞k=1, with T kκ →∞ as k →∞, satisfying, for all k ≥ 2,
wκ(T kκ ) = w
κ(T 1κ ),
and for all t ≥ T 1κ and k ≥ 1, there exists a period τ with T kκ < τ ≤ T k+1κ such that
wκ(t) = wκ(τ).










∈ WR(W κ). There exists t̂ ≥ 1 such that for all τ ≥ t̂,
wκ+1(τ) appears infinitely often in the sequence {wκ+1(t)}t. Moreover, there exists





κ+1) = w ∀w ∈ W κ.
Now, define W κ+1 = {σ(w,T 1κhT 1κ+1) : w ∈ R(W κ)}. By the definition of T 1κ+1, W κ ⊂
W κ+1. Just as in the initial step, there is an increasing sequence {T kκ+1}∞k=2, with
T kκ+1 →∞ as k →∞, satisfying, for all k ≥ 2
wκ+1(T kκ+1) = w
κ+1(T 1κ+1),
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and for all t ≥ T 1κ+1 and k ≥ 1, there exists a period τ with T kκ+1 < τ ≤ T k+1κ+1 such that
wκ+1(t) = wκ+1(τ),
concluding the recursive step.
Since W is finite, this process must eventually reach a point where W κ+1 = W κ.
We have thus identified a set of states W κ and two dates T 1κ and T
2
κ , such that letting
(ȳ1, . . . , ȳm) ≡T 1κhT 2κ and setting w̄ = σ(w̃, hT 1κ ) yields parts 1 and 2 of the Lemma.
Separation implies that under h, for any state w ∈ R(w̃)\{w̃} and for all players i,
there is some state reached infinitely from w under h at which i plays differently from
the state reached in that period from w̃. The dates T 1κ and T
2
κ have been chosen so
that any state reached infinitely often under h from a state w ∈ R(w̃) appears at least
once between T 1κ and T
2
κ on the path starting in period T
1
κ from the state σ(w, h
T 1κ ).
Consequently, we have part 3.
Finally, since
∣∣W 1∣∣ ≥ 2, |Wc| ≥ 2. If part 4 does not hold for the current choice
of cycle and states, by part 2, it will hold in some period of the cycle (ȳ1, . . . , ȳm), say
period `. Part 4 then holds as well for the cycle beginning in period `, (ȳ`, . . . , ȳm,
ȳ1, . . . , ȳ`−1), the state w̄ = σ(w̃, hT 1κ , ȳ1, . . . , ȳ`−1), and the set of cycling states is given
by {σ(w, ȳ1, . . . , ȳ`−1) : w ∈ Wc}.
We emphasize that each state in the set of states Wc cycles under the given finite
sequence of signals and every state reachable (infinitely often) in the same period as w̄
is taken into Wc by one round of the cycle.
The proof of Theorem 4 now proceeds by constructing a contradiction. So, suppose
there exists ζ > 0 such that for all k there exists a private monitoring game (u, (Ωk, πk))
strongly 1/k-close to (ũ∗, (Y, ρ)) with (Ωk, πk) having richness at least ζ, with the in-
duced private profile a Nash equilibrium of the private-monitoring game.
To develop intuition, suppose the space of signals for each player were independent
of k, so that Ωki = Ωi. Then, we can assume π
k converges to a limit distribution π∞
on Ω (by choosing a subsequence if necessary). The behavior of beliefs of player i over
the private states of the other players under the limit private monitoring distribution
(Ω, π∞) is significantly easier to describe. Since (Ω, πk) is strongly 1/k-close to (Y, ρ)
and πk → π∞, for each y ∈ Y the event {(ω1, . . . , ωn) : ωi ∈ f−1i (y)} is common belief
under π∞. Moreover, if the other players start in the same state (such as w̄) then they
stay in the same state thereafter. We can thus initially focus on finding the appropriate
sequence of signals to manipulate i’s updating about the current private states of the
other players, without being concerned about the possibility that subsequent realizations
will derail the process (we will deal with that issue subsequently). The difficulty, of
course, is that Ωki depends on k, and moreover, that in principle as k gets large, so may
Ωki .
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We can however, proceed as follows: For each k and ai ∈ Ai, let
Ωk,aii =
{
ωi ∈ Ωki : πki (ωi|ai, a′−i) > ζ for all a′−i ∈ A−i
}
.
Since (Ωk, πk) is strongly close to (Y, ρ), every signal in Ωki is associated with some
public signal, and so we can partition Ωk,aii into subsets of private signals associated
with the same public signal, Ωk,aii (y). Order arbitrarily the signals in ∪aiΩk,aii (y), and
give the `-th signal in the order the label (y, `). Let ki,y ≡
∣∣∣∪aiΩk,aii (y)
∣∣∣; note that
ki,y is (crudely) bounded above by |Ai| /ζ for all k. With this relabeling, and defining
Ωi ≡ ∪y∈Y {(y, 1), (y, 2), . . . , (y, ki,y)}, a finite set, we have, for all i and k,








Ωki ∩ Ωi 6= ∅.
Without loss of generality, we can assume (2) holds with equality (simply include any
signal ωi ∈ Ωi\Ωki in Ωki , so that πki (ωi|a) = 0).
For each y ∈ Y , we augment Ωi by a new signal denoted ωyi , and define Ω∞i ≡
Ωi ∪ (∪y{ωyi }). We interpret ωyi as i’s private signals associated with y that are not in
Ωi. For each k, we can interpret Ω∞i as a partition of Ω
k
i (each ωi ∈ Ωi appears as a
singleton, while ωyi ≡
{




: fi(ωi) = y
}
may be empty). For each
a ∈ A, denote by π̂k( · |a) the probability distribution on ∏i Ω∞i induced by πk( · |a).
Note that we now have a sequence of probability distributions {π̂k(·|a)}k for each a ∈ A










gent sequence with limit π∞(ω|a) for all a ∈ A, ω ∈ ∏i Ω∞i . Note that (Ω∞, π∞) is
0-close to (Y, ρ). Moreover, by passing to a further subsequence if necessary, we can
also assume that, for each i, ai ∈ Ai, and y ∈ Y , the convex hull of the set of vec-
tors {γ∞a (ωi) : ωi ∈ f−1i (y) , π∞i (ωi|ai, a′−i) > ζ for all a′−i ∈ A−i} has a nonempty
intersection with <|A−i|−1ζ , where γ∞aa′−i(ωi) ≡ log π
∞







In the following lemma, a private signal ωj for player j is consistent with the private
signal ωi for player i if fj(ωj) = fi(ωi), where fi and fj are the signaling functions from
Definition 4. It is an implication of this lemma that if player i assigns strictly positive
probability to all the other players being in the state w̄, then after sufficient repetitions
of the cycle ~ωLi , player i eventually assigns probability arbitrarily close to 1 that at the
end of a cycle, all the other players are in the state w̄.
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Lemma 7 Fix a finite separating public profile of the public-monitoring game, and let
w̄, ŵ, Wc, and i be the states, set of states, and player identified in Lemma 6. Then,
there exists a finite sequence of private signals for player i, ~ωLi ≡ (ω1i , ω2i , . . . , ωLi ), such
that
1. σi(ŵ, ~ωLi ) = ŵ,
2. for all sequences of private signals, ~ωLj , for player j 6= i consistent with ~ωLi ,
σj(w, ~ωLj ) = w for all w ∈ Wc, and
3. for all w ∈ Wn−1c \{w̄1},
A(~ωLi ;w) ≡
Pr∞(~ωLi |w−i = w, wi = ŵ)
Pr∞(~ωLi |w−i = w̄1, wi = ŵ)
< 1, (3)
where Pr∞ denotes probabilities calculated under π∞ and the assumption that all
players follow the private profile.
Proof. The cycle ȳ1, . . . , ȳm from Lemma 6 induces a cycle in the states w̄ =









. Let ã` ≡ (â`i , ā`−i). Richness implies that for each `, there







γ∞ã`,a′−i (ωi) = log π
∞
i (ωi|ã`)/π∞i (ωi|â`i , a′−i),










ωi∈f−1i (y`) nωi for each `, denote by N
′ the lowest common multiple
of {n1, . . . , nm}. Let ~ωLi denote the cycle of private signals for player i consistent with
cycling N times through the public signals ȳ1, ȳ2 . . . , ȳm and in which for each `, the
private signal ωi ∈ f−1i (y`) appears (N ′/n`) nωi times. This cycle is of length L ≡ mN ′.
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Given a private state profile w ∈ Wn−1c , let ǎ`−i denote the action profile taken in
period ` of the cycle. Then,
A(~ωLi ;w) ≡
Pr∞(~ωLi |wt−i = w, wi = ŵ)

















For w 6= w̄1, then in each period at least one player is in a private state different from
w̄. From Lemma 6.2, ǎ`−i 6= ã`−i for at least one `, and so A(~hLi ;w) must be strictly less
than 1.
We are, of course, primarily concerned with private monitoring under the distribu-
tion (Ωk, πk). In this situation, one must deal with the possibility that player j’s private
signals may be inconsistent with player i’s observations. However, by choosing k suffi-
ciently large, one can ensure that this possibility does not arise with large probability
along the cycle ~ωLi . The subsequent lemma implies that this possibility never arises
with large probability.
Lemma 8 Assume the hypotheses of Lemma 7, and let hti be a private history for player
i satisfying ŵ = σi(hti). For all η > 0, there exists ξ > 0 and k
′ (independent of hti) such
that, for all k > k′, if η < Prk(wt−i ∈ Wn−1c \{w̄1}|hti) < 1 and Prk(wt−i /∈ Wn−1c |hti) < ξ,
then
Prk(wt+L−i 6= w̄1|~ωLi , hti)






where Prk denotes probabilities calculated under πk and the assumption that all players
follow the private profile, and ~ωLi is the sequence identified in Lemma 7.
Proof. For clarity, we suppress the conditioning on hti. Denote the event that
players other than i observe some sequence of private signals consistent with the cycle
(ȳ1, . . . , ȳm)N by ~y−i, and the complementary event by ¬~y−i. Then,
Prk(wt+L−i 6= w̄1, ~ωLi ) = Prk(wt+L−i 6= w̄1, ~ωLi , ~y−i) + Prk(wt+L−i 6= w̄1, ~ωLi , ¬~y−i)
and
Prk(wt+L−i 6= w̄1, ~ωLi , ~y−i)
≤ Prk(wt−i 6= w̄1, ~ωLi , ~y−i)
= Prk(wt−i ∈ Wn−1c \{w̄1}, ~ωLi , ~y−i) + Prk(wt−i /∈ Wn−1c \{w̄1}, ~ωLi , ~y−i),
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where the inequality arises because a player j 6= i may be in a private state not in Wc.
Now,
Prk(wt−i ∈ Wn−1c \{w̄1}, ~ωLi , ~y−i)
= Prk(~ωLi , ~y−i|wt−i ∈ Wn−1c \{w̄1}) Prk(wt−i ∈ Wn−1c \{w̄1})
≤ Prk(~ωLi , ~y−i|wt−i ∈ Wn−1c \{w̄1}) Prk(wt−i 6= w̄1),
and if Prk(wt−i /∈ Wn−1c \{w̄1}) < ξ (where ξ is to be determined),
Prk(wt−i /∈ Wn−1c \{w̄1}, ~ωLi , ~y−i) + Prk(wt+L−i 6= w̄1, ~ωLi , ¬~y−i)
< ξ + Prk(wt+L−i 6= w̄1, ~ωLi , ¬~y−i)
≤ ξ + Prk(~ωLi , ¬~y−i)
= ξ + Prk(¬~y−i|~ωLi ) Prk(~ωLi ).
Moreover,
Prk(wt+L−i = w̄1, ~ω
L
i ) ≥ Prk(wt−i = w̄1, ~ωLi , ~y−i)
= Prk(~ωLi , ~y−i|wt−i = w̄1) Prk(wt−i = w̄1).
Defining
xt (k) ≡ 1
Prk(wt−i 6= w̄1)
(




Prk(wt+L−i 6= w̄1|~ωLi )
Prk(wt+L−i = w̄1|~ωLi )
<
Prk(~ωLi , ~y−i|wt−i ∈ Wn−1c \{w̄1}) + xt (k)






maxw∈W n−1c \{w̄1} Prk(~ω
L
i , ~y−i|wt−i = w) + xt (k)













Prk(~ωLi , ~y−i|wt−i = w)
Prk(~ωLi , ~y−i|wt−i = w̄1)
< 1,
and so there is an there is an ξ′ > 0 sufficiently small so that (recall that the denominator





Prk(~ωLi , ~y−i|wt−i = w) + ξ′
Prk(~ωLi , ~y−i|wt−i = w̄1)
< 1− ξ′.
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The finiteness of the state space and the number of players allows us to interchange the
max and lim operations. Consequently, there exists k′′ such that for all k ≥ k′′,
maxw∈W n−1c \{w̄1} Prk(~ω
L
i , ~y−i|wt−i = w) + ξ′
Prk(~ωLi , ~y−i|wt−i = w̄1)
< 1− ξ′. (7)
Since (Ω, πk) is strongly 1/k-close to (Y, ρ), limk→∞ Prk(¬~y−i|~ωLi ) = 0, and so there
exists k′′′ such that Prk(¬~y−i|~ωLi ) < ξ′η/2 for all k ≥ k′′′. Suppose ξ = ξ′η//2 and
k′ = max{k′′, k′′′}. Since η < Prk(wt−i ∈ Wn−1c \{w̄1}) ≤ Prk(wt−i 6= w̄1), xt(k) ≤ ξ′.
Consequently (7), with (6), implies (5) (since ξ < ξ′).
Lemma 6 guarantees that one round of the cycle of signals will always take a state
not in Wc into Wc, ensuring that the probability on states in W\Wc can be controlled.
Lemma 9 Assume the hypotheses of Lemma 7, and let hti be a private history for player
i satisfying ŵ = σi(hti). Fix η > 0 and let ξ and k
′ be the constants identified in Lemma
8 . There exists T such that if t ≥ T , then for all k > k′,
Prk(wt+L−i /∈ Wn−1c |~ωLi , hti) < ξ.
Proof. Fix T large enough, so that if w̄ ∈ Wt (the set of states reachable in period
t) for t ≥ T , then Wt ⊂ R(w̄) . Separation then implies Prk(wt+L−i /∈ Wn−1c , ~y−i) = 0,
and so
Prk(wt+L−i /∈ Wn−1c | ~ωLi )
= Prk(wt+L−i /∈ Wn−1c , ~y−i| ~ωLi ) + Prk(wt+L−i /∈ Wn−1c , ¬~y−i| ~ωLi )
= Prk(wt+L−i /∈ Wn−1c , ¬~y−i| ~ωLi )
≤ Prk(¬~y−i| ~ωLi ),
which is less than ξ for k ≥ k′.
We are now in a position to complete the proof. Suppose ĥti is a private history
for player i that leads to the private state ŵ with t ≥ T , and let η be the constant
required by Theorem 3. Since ŵ and w̄ are both reachable in the same period, with
positive probability player i observes a private history ĥti that leads to the private state
ŵ. Moreover, at ĥti his posterior beliefs that all the other players are in the private
state w̄, Prk(wt−i = w̄1|ĥti), is strictly positive for all k, though converging to 0 as
k → ∞ (where Prk denotes probabilities under πk). If Prk(wt−i 6= w̄1|ĥti) ≤ η, then
Prk(wt−i = w̄1|ĥti) > 1 − η, and since di(ŵ) 6= di(ŵ), Theorem 3 yields the desired
conclusion.
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Suppose then that Prk(wt−i 6= w̄1|ĥti) > η, and k > k′, where k′ is from Lemma 8.
Lemmas 8 and 9 immediately imply that, as long as Prk(wt+κL−i 6= w̄1|hti, (~ωLi )κ) > η,




i ) ≤ η, at
which point we are in the first case (since ŵ cycles under ~ωLi , i’s private state continually
returns to ŵ).
We conclude by explaining how the difficulty identified in the Introduction is dealt
with. In the above argument, the length of the cycle was determined by Lemma 7
from the limit distribution (Ω∞, π∞), independently of Prk(wt−i = w̄1|ĥti). Lemma 6 is
critical here, since it allows us to focus on a cycle, rather than an entire outcome path.
We then considered private-monitoring games sufficiently far out in the sequence, such
that along the cycle, state transitions occur as expected with high probability (Lemmas
8 and 9). Since we can use a cycle to manipulate beliefs, the magnitude of the prior is
irrelevant; all we need is that Prk(wt−i = w̄1|ĥti) > 0.
A. Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose (u∗, (Ω, π)) is ε-close to (ũ∗, (Y, ρ)) with associated















u∗i (ωi, ai)π(ω1, . . . , ωn|a)− ũ∗i (y, ai)ρ(y|a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣


















+ ε + |Y | εmax
ωi,ai
|u∗i (ωi, ai)|
≤ 2 |Y | ε max
ωi,ai
|u∗i (ωi, ai)|+ ε + ε2 |Y | ,
where the first inequality follows from
∑
y π ({ω : fi (ωi) = y for each i}| a) > 1− ε |Y |
(an implication of part 1 of Definition 4), the second equality follows from |ũ∗i (y, ai)− u∗i (ωi, ai)| <
ε for all i ∈ N , ai ∈ Ai, and ωi ∈ f−1i (y), and the third inequality from part 1 of Defi-
nition 4 and maxy,ai |ũ∗i (y, ai)| ≤ maxωi,ai |u∗i (ωi, ai)| + ε. The last term can clearly be
made smaller than η by appropriate choice of ε.
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Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose there exists L such that for all w,w′ ∈ W reachable
in the same period and for all h ∈ Y ∞,
σ(w, hL) = σ(w′, hL).
Then, for all w, w′ ∈ W reachable in the same period and for all h ∈ Y ∞,
d(σ(w, ht)) = d(σ(w′, ht)) ∀t ≥ L + 1.
If w = σ(w1, y1, . . . , yt−L−1) and w′ = σ(w1, ŷ1, . . . , ŷt−L−1), then
s(ht) = d(σ(w, yt−L, . . . , yt−1))
= d(σ(w′, yt−L, . . . , yt−1))
= d(σ(w′, ŷt−L, . . . , ŷt−1)) = s(ĥt).
Suppose now the profile s has bounded recall. Let (W,w1, σ, d) be a representation
of s. Suppose w and w′ are two states reachable in the same period. Then there exists
hτ and ĥτ such that w = σ(w1, hτ ) and w′ = σ(w1, ĥτ ). Then, for all h ∈ Y ∞, (hτ , ht)
and (ĥτ , ht) agree for the last t− 1 periods, and so if t ≥ L + 1, they agree for at least
the last L periods, and so
d(σ(w, ht)) = s(hτ , ht)
= s(ĥτ , ht) = d(σ(w′, ht)).
Minimality of the representing automaton then implies that for all h ∈ Y ∞ and w,w′ ∈
W reachable in the same period, σ(w, hL) = σ(w′, hL).
Proof of Theorem 3. Let φi (w) be player i’s continuation value from the strategy
profile (W,w, σ, d) in the game with public monitoring (i.e., φi(w) is the continuation




), and let φi (si|w) be the continuation
value to player i from following the strategy si when all the other players follow the
strategy profile (W,w, σ, d). Since the public profile is a strict equilibrium and |W | < ∞,
there exists θ > 0 such that for all i, w ∈ W , and s̃i, a deviation continuation strategy
for player i with s̃1i 6= di (w),
φi (s̃i|w) < φi (w)− θ.
Every strategy s̃i in the game with public monitoring induces a strategy si in the

























Denote by V πi (w) the expected value to player i in the game with private monitoring





i’s continuation value of a strategy si in the game with private monitoring, conditional
on the private history hti.
There exists ε and η > 0 such that for all strategies s̃i for player i in the game with
public monitoring, and all histories hti for i in the game with private monitoring, if the









∣∣ < θ/3, where si is the induced
strategy in the game with private monitoring. (The argument is essentially the same as
that of Mailath and Morris (2002, Lemma 3).)
Suppose there exists a player i, a private history hti, and a state w such that di (w) 6=
di(σi(hti)) and βi(w1|hti) > 1 − η. Denote by s′i the private strategy described by
(W,w, σi, di), s̃′i the public strategy described by (W,w, σ, di), si the private strategy






i|hti) > φi(s̃′i|w)− θ/3 = φi(w)− θ/3
> φi(s̃i|w) + 2θ/3
> V πi (si|hti) + θ/3
= V πi (σi(h
t
i)) + θ/3,
so that s′i is a profitable deviation.
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